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MAKING TOBACCO COMPANIES PAY:
THE FLORIDA MEDICAID THIRD-PARTY
LIABILITY ACT
ChristaSarafa"

INTRODUCTION
At present, the tobacco industry is confronting more than a
half-dozen lawsuits unfurled by struttingstate governors or
attorneys general without even a curtsey toward
evenhandedness. When crusaderscapture the catbird'sseat,
especially when they trumpet moral righteousness like the
anti-tobaccomissionaries,courtsshould be vigilant toprotect
justicefrom their mavs.'
Less than two years ago, it was possible to count on one hand the number
of lawsuits pending against the tobacco industry. Today, however, at least
forty-one states have filed complaints against the various tobacco
companies seeking reimbursement of Medicaid expenditures for cigaretterelated illnesses.2 State governments have concluded the public should
not pay for the medical expenses resulting from a patient's past practice
of smoking tobacco. Yet, forgotten somehow in all this litigation is
concern for the physical health of the American people. The various state
complaints seem to ignore the fact that regardless of who pays the medical
bills, smokers will continue to smoke. Unfortunately, these governments
*Articles Editor, JOURNAL OF HEALTH CAPE LAW; B.A., University of Michigan, 1994;
J.D., DePaul University, 1998.
'Bruce Fein, Justice Tilted By Ashes?, VASH. TLss, July 16, 1996, at A14.
2
Iowa Judge DismissesPortionofState Suit Against Tobacco Company, Health Care Daily
(BNA) at D-5 (Aug. 29, 1997). Mississippi became the first state to file suit against the industry
on June 6,1994 (Governor, TobaccoMakers Sue Attorney Generalto HaltMedicaidSuit, 4 Health
Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at D-21 (Feb. 26, 1996).
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have done little to alleviate this problem. Instead of focusing on bettering
the current state of public health through education and awareness of
various health risks accompanying smoking, state officials have launched
a steady effort to punish and recover funds from those corporate entities
that may have had a causal role in producing various diseases present in
today's society. As a result, and due to current notions that smoking is no
longer an acceptable habit, cigarette manufacturers have become the
victims ofrelentless state attacks on their purported third-party liability for
Medicaid payments made on behalf of recipients who have cigaretterelated illnesses.3
While the majority of states have based their claims on common law
principles of equity, Florida proceeded with a unique tactic. With passage
of the 1994 Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, the state of Florida
created an independent cause of action against third parties who may have
caused the injuries of Medicaid recipients.4 Under this statute, potentially
liable third-parties are prohibited from invoking traditional affirmative
defenses, otherwise provided by Florida law.5 Although the statute
applies to any entity that may be liable for causing Medicaid recipients'
illnesses, the state has only used it as a basis for its recent claim against
the tobacco industry.6
Because of the ramifications this statute may have on the Florida
business climate, Associated Industries of Florida, which represents a
variety of businesses throughout the state, brought an action seeking to
have the statute held unconstitutional.7 The Florida Supreme Court,
'The major cigarette manufacturers listed in the various state complaints include: The
American Tobacco Corp, Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., Liggett Group, Lorillard
Tobacco Corp., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., and Philip Morris. See AG Sues Tobacco Industry
for Smoking-Related Health Costs, 4 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at D-29 (May 6,
1996); State AGAsks Courtto Sanction Tobacco Firmsfor "Frivolous"Suits, 4 Health Care Pol'y
Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at D-39 (May 20, 1996). Other defendants named are the parent companies
of these manufacturers, consisting of American Brands, R.J.R. Nabisco, British American Tobacco
Co., Batus Holdings, Philip Morris Companies, The Brook Group LTD., in the United States
Tobacco Co., and the American Tobacco Co., No. 95-1466-AO (Palm Beach Cty. Cir. Ct. Filed
Feb. 21, 1995), available in LEXIS (hereinafter, Florida Complaint). Also named are two
tobacco trade associations, The Council for Tobacco Research and The Tobacco Institute, as well
as the consulting
group of Hill & Knowlton, (FL comp.)
4
FLA. STAT. § 409.910(6)(A) (Supp. 1994).
'Id. at 409.910(6)(B).
6
FloridaComplaint,supra note 3.
7
Associated Ind. of Fla. v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., No. 94-3128 (Leon Cty.
Cir. Ct. filed June 30, 1995), available in LEXIS.
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however, disagreed with Associated Industries declaring the statute
facially constitutional.' Although the denial of defenses seems to violate
the norms of the American judicial system, the Supreme Court of the
United States denied Associated Industries' petition for writ of certiorari. 9
In doing so, the High Court endorsed a statute that appears to guarantee
an imbalance in the Florida courts in litigation brought in relation to thirdparty Medicaid claims. At the same time, the Court's decision permits
continuance of an unfair attack on one industry, while allowing other
parties that may be at fault, including smokers and the government itself,
to remain free of liability.
This comment analyzes the current state of tobacco litigation in light
of the Florida decision by first presenting a background of the history of
tobacco litigation, as well as the legislative events leading up to the case.
This comment then provides an overview of the opinion of the Florida
Supreme Court, including its vigorous dissent. An analysis of the
implications of the statute and the case follows, arguing that the dissenting
opinion is better reasoned than the majority opinion, and that the end
result of the majority opinion imposes an unfair disadvantage upon the
tobacco industry. The impact of this case will then be discussed, along
with a brief account of problems that have already occurred.
BACKGROUND
The History of Tobacco Litigation
Tobacco has been used and enjoyed by millions of people for over 400
years.'" Tobacco originated as an important agricultural crop that aided the
development of the American economy, and the industry continues to be
the source of many economic benefits such as employment, taxes, and

"Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Ind. of Fla., 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996).
9
Associated Ind. of Fla. v. Agency for Health Care Admin. _ S.Ct., 1996 VL 723400
(1997).
'See Roysdon v. R1. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (E.D. Tenn. 19S5),
affid, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988). There are reports that tobacco originally entered the United

States via Christopher Columbus and other European explorers in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, although knowledge of its existence dates back to 600 A.D. See U.r r.D STATES
DEPART ET OF HEALTH AND H.MAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CoNSsEQUECES OF SMOKIG:
NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 9 (1988).
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consumer spending." Currently, tobacco is one of the nation's leading
agricultural exports and provides for twenty percent of the world's

tobacco. 12
As the practice of smoking cigarettes became more and more popular
throughout the years, it came to be regarded as providing certain personal

benefits as well. For instance, smoking cigarettes has a calming effect that
is useful to many people for relieving stress. 13 Cigarettes also have the
ability to stimulate a smoker who is in a state of low arousal. 4 The
practice has also been known to help control weight.' 5 In any event,

smoking is enjoyed by many for the simple reason that it provides
pleasure. 6 In many instances, the actual risk or "thrill" of smoking is
precisely what attracts many consumers.' 7

Although cigarettes have undoubtedly provided numerous economic
and mental health benefits to many people, these products have also been8

the apparent source of a variety of serious and/or fatal illnesses.'

Questions about the adverse health effects of smoking cigarettes began in
the 17th century and have continued to pervade modem scientific research

which has since established a connection between tobacco use and health

"Douglas N. Jacobsen, After Cipollone v. Liggett Croup:How Wide Will the Floodgates
of CigaretteLitigation Open?, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 1021, 1026 (19._). In 1983, the tobacco
industry generatedjobs for 2.5 percent of American workers. Its profits generated 2.5 percent of
the 1983 gross national product. Id. (citing CHASE ECONOMETRICS, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY at I- I to 1-24 (1983)).
12Jacobsen, supra note 11, at 1027.
3 Elizabeth A. Frohlich, Statutes Aiding Recovery of Medicaid Costs From Tobacco
Companies:A Better Strategy ForRedressingAn IdentificideHarm, 21 AM. J. L, & MED. 445,
446 (1995).
'4 d.
'51d.
"'Richard N. Pearson, The FloridaMedicaidThird-PartyLiabilityAct, 46 FLA. L. REv. 609,
619 (1994).
17Id.
"According to the Surgeon General of the United States, cigarette smoking has been linked
to coronary heart disease, peripheral arterial occlusive disease, cerebrovascular disease, lung
cancer, cancer of the larynx, oral cancer, cancer of the esophagus, cancer of the bladder, cancer
of the pancreas, chronic obstructive lung disease, emphysema, gastrointestinal disease, premature
births, and various oral disease including periodontal disease and tooth loss. Jacobsen, supra note
11, at 1028. Cigarette smoking is also a probable cause of infertility, peptic ulcer disease, and
cancer of the kidney, cervix and stomach. See Frohlich supra note 13, at 446. According to the
Centers for Disease Control, approximately 400,000 deaths each year can be attributed to smoking.
See Torts - Products Liability Florida Enacts Market Share Liability For Smoking-Relatcd
MedicaidExpenditures - Medicaid Third-PartyLiabilityAct of 1994, 108 HARv. L. REv. 525,
529 n. 1 (1994).
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problems. 19 This debate led to a long series of unsuccessful lawsuits

against cigarette manufacturers that continues to persist today.
Since 1954, cigarette smokers have been attempting to recover

damages from tobacco manufacturers for cigarette-related illnesses. '
Because the manufacturers have previously been able to use affirmative
defenses such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and federal

preemption of common law tort liability, they have almost never been held
liable.2 Until recently, these cases have been classified into two "waves"

of tobacco litigation. 22
The first wave of cases occurred during the 1950s and 1960s and
revolved around theories of negligence, implied warranty, deceit, and

express warranty.3 Only ten cases were reported during this first wave of
litigation. Of these ten cases, four were voluntarily dropped by the

plaintiffs. 24 It is apparent from these cases that the plaintiffs lacked the
enthusiasm and resources to participate in prolonged litigation.' Three
of the cases resulted injury verdicts in favor of the defendants because the

juries found that the cigarette manufacturers could not have foreseen the
exact consequences of smoking.26 This same reasoning led to entries of

summary judgment for the defendants in the last three cases that fall under
this "first wave" of litigation.2 7
19jacobson, supra note 11, at 1027.
'Old. at 14.
2
'Before the verdict for the plaintiff in Cipollone v. Liggatt Group, 693 F. Supp. 203 (D.NJ.
1988), the cigarette industry had never lost or settled a products liability claim. Excluding the
current negotiation, only one other plaintiff's victory has occurred. Sce Caner v. Brown &
Williamrson Tobacco Corp., Fla. Dist. Ct, No. 95-00934 CA, Aug. 9, 1996. Sce also, .ttorncys
PredictMore Lawsuits Following Verdict to FormerSmoker 4 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No.
34, at D-34 (Aug. 19, 1996).
'See Mark Z. Edell, CigaretteLitigation: 1e Sccond IY'r, 22 ToRT &lrts. LJ. 90 (19S6).
13Id.

"4See Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961); Fine v. Philip Morns,
239 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D.
Pa. 1960); Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961).
'Edell, supra note 22, at 9 1.
26
See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), quefion certifled on
rehg, 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1962), rev'd, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1962), revd 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.
1968), rev'dper curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en bane), ccri. dcnicd, 416 U.S. 951
(1970); Lartigue v. RI.L Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. dcnicd,375 U.S.
865 (1963); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
'See Hudson v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970); Albnght v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972), a9rd,485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert.denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974); Cooper v. RI. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (Ist Cir.
1956).
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After enjoying somewhat of a hiatus from litigation during the 1970s,
a second wave of lawsuits began in the 1980s.28 These lawsuits revolved
around changes in products liability law, new scientific and medical
research about the relationship between cigarettes and disease, evolving
public opinion on smoking, and coordination among plaintiffs' attorneys.29
Because cigarette companies could not be held strictly liable and
assumption of risk was still an effective defense for the tobacco industry,
this second wave of cases also failed."
Significantly, in Roysdon v. R.J.Reynolds, the court explicitly held
that tobacco companies could not be strictly liable for diseases acquired
by smokers because common knowledge of the adverse effects of smoking
precluded a finding that cigarettes are defective or unreasonably
dangerous.3 ' The Roysdon court based its decision on comment (i) to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS which uses tobacco as an example of
a product that is not considered unreasonably dangerous to consumers.32
The court found that the characteristics of smoking had been fully
explored and that its harmful effects were so widespread that it could be
considered common knowledge.33 Thus, cigarette companies could not be
strictly liable for the production of cigarettes.
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
The succession of legal victories for the tobacco industry was further
reinforced by the defense of preemption which was created by the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. 4 This 1965 Act mandated the
now familiar warnings regarding the risks of smoking be placed on each
individual package of cigarettes, as well as on all cigarette

28

Jacobson, supra note 11, at 1034.
1d.

29

3

Karen E. Meade, Breaking Through The Tobacco Industry's Smoke Screen, 17 J. LEGAL

MED. 113, 122 (1996).
3
tRoysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
2

RESTATEMENT
,
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i ("Good whiskey is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially
dangerous to alcoholics; Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects
of smoking may be harmful ...").
33
Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1192.
3415 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a) (West Supp. 1995).
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advertisements."a Responding to the growing awareness of the health
hazards of cigarette smoking, Congress declared that the purpose of the
Act was to inform the public of the hazards of smoking, protect commerce
and the national economy, and promote uniformity in advertising.36
The preemption defense, based on the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI of the United States Constitution, provides that federal law supersedes
state law when both attempt to control the same subject matter.3 7 This
defense was used to absolve various cigarette manufacturers of countless
legal disputes because compliance with the Act prevents any further
liability based on the failure to warn.3" Thus, when faced with litigation,
the cigarette companies have rightly asserted they are not compelled to
provide any additional information regarding the health risks of smoking
other than that mandated by the federal government through the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act. 9
The Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act also contains a provision
regarding mandatory reports to Congress by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services and the Federal Trade Commission." This provision
instructs the Secretary to submit annual reports concerning current
information on the health consequences of smoking, as well as
recommendations for appropriate legislation.41 The Commission is
instructed to submit annual reports and recommendations regarding
current practices and methods of cigarette advertising and promotions.42
According to the statute, the annual submission of these reports began on
January 1, 1971. 43 Essentially, these provisions require the Secretary and
the Commission to conduct a yearly inquiry into the status of cigarettes
and their relationship to human health.
3

Sd. Currently, all cigarette labels and advertisements must cary one of the following four
warnings: Surgeon General's Waming: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Diseaze, Emphys=ma,
and May Complicate Pregnancy, Surgeon General's Warning: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health; Surgeon General's Warning: Smoking By Pregnant
Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight; Surgeon General's
Warning:
Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide. Jacobson, supranote 11, at nA6
36IL; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a) (West Supp. 1995). Sce also Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco,
Co., 849 F.2d. 230, 235 (6th Cir. 1987).
37
U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
3S15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West 1997).
39See Meade, supra note 30, at 123.
4
01d.

411d.

421d.

431d.
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The Supreme Court considered the preemption issue in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group affirming the Cigarette Labeling Act preempts claims that
cigarette manufacturers failed to warn consumers of the dangers of
smoking. 44 The Court's holding applied to warnings in general, which
includes all cigarette advertisements and promotions. 4 Presumably, this
holding did not include failure to warn claims in other contexts such as
fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy to conceal material facts about
the hazards of smoking, breach of express warranty, and defective
design.46
A recent case in the Fifth Circuit, however, proved the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act can be used to preempt attacks upon the
cigarette industry that go beyond the scope of a general warning. Algood
v. RJ Reynolds was based on claims of fraudulent misrepresentation
regarding the company's efforts to research the consequences of cigarette
smoking, as well as fraudulent concealment of the health risks of
smoking. 47 The court specifically stated, "To the extent that plaintiffs'
claims are based on fraudulent concealment ...
they are preempted by the
' Alternatively, the court
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act."48
reiterated the common knowledge theory of Roysdon by comparing the
dangers of cigarette smoking to the dangers of alcohol consumption.
According to the court, it has long been undisputed among society that
both alcohol and cigarettes pose a danger to society. 49 Thus, the court
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants and held that the
tobacco company had no duty to warn the plaintiff of the dangers of
cigarette smoking.5"
Recent Litigation
Despite the immunity from suit provided by the preemption defense, some
cases have been able to proceed to trial. Recently, in Carterv. Brown &
Williamson, a Florida jury found the tobacco company liable to a sixty-six
year-old man with lung cancer for negligently failing to warn consumers

"Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
4
S1d. at 524.

"Id. at 528-30 (holding that claims must be based on a duty based on smoking and health).
47
Allgood v. RJL Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168 (51h Cir. 1996).
4'Id. at 171.
49Id. at 172.
50
1d.
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that Lucky Strike cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous and defectives5
The Carterjury was the first since Cipollone to hold a cigarette company
liable.52 This unexpected verdict was a shock to the tobacco industry;
nevertheless, Carterdid not represent a sudden shift in cigarette pro ductliability lawsuits favoring plaintiffs. This was evidenced approximately
two weeks after Carter, when an Indiana jury refused to find R.J.
53
Reynolds liable for the death of a long-time smoker with lung cancer.
Another recent case demonstrates the attitude that the tobacco
industry should not have to pay for injuries that stem from the
manufacture and use of cigarettes. In Raulerson v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco

Corp., a different Florida jury found R.J. Reynolds was not negligent and
Winston and Salem cigarettes were not unreasonably dangerous.5 4 The
jury also said cigarettes did not contribute to the 1993 death of Raulerson's
sister, who was a long-time smoker." This case was decided in the midst
of strong efforts by the anti-smoking industry to influence public opinion,
proving that even under external conditions most favorable to plaintiffs,
a reasonable jury can find for the tobacco industry. 6
Although plaintiffs have traditionally been unsuccessful in bringing
claims against the tobacco industry, a new class of plaintiffs, the
individual states, has surfaced. The number of state complaints against
the tobacco industry is steadily increasing. Most states are confined to
traditional theories of subrogation, assignment, or lien, which puts the
state in the same position as a Medicaid recipient Would be in had they
brought the claim on their own behalf. Traditionally, a state has no legal
basis to claim relief as an individual plaintiff, and must act on behalf of its
Medicaid recipients. Florida passed legislation creating an independent
cause of action for the state and requiring the judiciary to conduct the

StAttorneys PredictMore LawsuitsFollowing Verdict To FormerSmoker, 4 Health Care
Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at D-43 (Aug. 19, 1996) (citing Carter Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., Fla. Dist. Ct, No. 95-00934 CA, verdict Aug. 9, 1996).
5

id.

Hundreds Sue Tobacco Makers, Sellers in Floridain Wake ofS750,O0 Verdict. 4 Health
Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at D-53 (Sep. 9, 1996) (citing Rogers, RJ. Reymolds Tobacco Co.)
UJustice Department Appeals April 25 Ruling on FDA Jurisdiction, 5 HEALTH CAME POL'Y
REP. (BNA) No. 19, at D-18 (May 12, 1997) (citing Raulerson, RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Corp., Fla.
Cir. Ct. 4th Jud. Dist. Duval Cty., No. 95-01820-CA, defense verdict, May 5, 1997).
SSd.

s6Il
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resulting trial in a way that seriously limits the tobacco industry's ability

to defend itself"
Medicaid And Third-Party Liability
Medicaid is a medical assistance program established by title XIX of the
Social Security Act.58 Under this program, state governments cooperate
with the federal government to provide medical services to eligible
individuals and families." The federal government shares the costs of
The
Medicaid with the states that elect to participate in this program.
60
states, in turn, must comply with the requirements of the Act.

One such requirement is that state plans for medical assistance must
provide that the administering agency will "take all reasonable measures
to pay for care and service
to ascertain the legal liability of third parties ...

available under the plan. ' 6' These measures include collecting
information in order to enable the state to pursue claims against third
parties.62 In addition, after an inquiry into potential liability, the state is
obligated to seek reimbursement from all third parties where legal liability
has been found to exist.63
Currently, the system of Medicaid is failing financially. In fact, it is64
in danger of becoming completely insolvent within the next ten years.
A strong policy of health care reform has yet to bring Medicaid back to a
stable position.65 Consequently, state governments have launched to
recover some of that money paid out by bringing litigation against
potentially liable third parties." Although the states have had an ongoing
duty to ascertain third-party liability since Medicaid's enactment in 1968,
they have just now begun to focus on holding third parties, namely the
7See FLA. STAT. ch. 409.266(3) (1978), FLA. STAT. ch.5409.2665 (Supp. 1990), 1994 FLA.
ch. 94-251 § 4.
5842 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West 1997).
59Massachusetts v. Philip Morris, 1996 WL 544205, at 12 (D. Mass. 1996) (citing Haley
v. Commn'r of Pub. Welfare, 476 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Mass. 1985)).
0
Massachusetts,1996 WL 544205, at *2 (citing Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156-57
(1986) (citations omitted)).
6142 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(25)(B) (West 1997).
62
Id.
6342 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(25)(B) (West 1997).
'Mark D. Fridy, How the Tobacco Industry May PayForPublicHealth CareExpenditures
CausedBy Smoking: A Look at the Next Wave ofSuing- Against the Tobacco Industry, 72 IND.
L.J. 235,237 (1996).
LAWS

6

SId

66Id.
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tobacco industry, liable. In order to facilitate this recovery, Florida passed
a statute that takes away potentially liable parties' right to adequately
defend themselves.
The Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act
The State of Florida, like every other state, has been authorized through
federal law to seek reimbursement of Medicaid payments since the
government program was enacted in 1968.67 In 1978, however, the
Florida legislature enacted a state statute which explicitly allowed for
recovery of Medicaid expenditures from third parties.63 This statute
granted Florida a traditional subrogation action which allowed the state to
pursue third-party benefits as if it were in the same position of a Medicaid
recipient. 69 Subrogation is a legal device by which one person (the
subrogee) has paid money to another (the subrogor), and this payment
should have been made by a third person.70 In such a situation, the payor
does not have his own right to bring a cause of action' Rather, the payor
brings a cause of action to recover funds as if he were the payee.' Thus,
the 1978 subrogation right enacted by Florida allowed the state to bring
an action against third parties as if it were the Medicaid recipient.
In 1990, the statute was again modified in order to strengthen the
state's ability to recover Medicaid costs.' Under these amendments,
subrogation was still the primary method of recovery. 74 However, in
1994 the statute was modified much more significantly!' These

6742 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (West 1997); sce also Agency for Health Care Admin. v..
Associated Ind. of Fla., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1244 (1996).

6"1978 FLA. LAWS ch. 78-433, § 1.
6FLA. STAT. clh. 409.266(3) (Supp. 1978) ("A public assistance applicant or recipient shall
inform the department of any rights he has to third-party payments for medical services. The
department shall automatically be subrogated to any such rights the recipient has to third-party
payments and shall recover to the fullest extent possible the amount of all medical assistance
payments made on behalf of the recipient.")
7OPearson, supra note 16, at 611 (citing ROBERT E. KEETON4 & ALAN I. VIDDIS, INSuxRACE

LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND CONZERCIAL PRACTICES

219 (1988)).
71

72

.d

' 1d. (It is said that the subrogee "stands in the shoes" of the subrogor, and enforces the
subrogor's
right to payment.)
73
FLA. STAT. ch. 5409.2665 (Supp. 1990); see also Agency for Health Care Admin. v.
Associated
Ind. of Fla., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1244 (1996).
74

Id.

7S199 4 FLA. LAWS ch. 94-251 § 4.
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amendments have caused much dispute amongst the legislature, the parties
involved, and the citizens of Florida.76 A major criticism of the Act is that

third parties who may be liable for Medicaid costs may no longer use
comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and "all other affirmative
defenses normally available to a liable third party. ' 77 The Act also creates

a new, independent cause of action in which the state can sue third parties
on its own terms without regard to the interests or rights of an individual
Medicaid recipient.78 Under this legislation, the state can make claims for
Medicaid reimbursement without having to occupy the position of a
Medicaid recipient. Essentially, the state becomes a victim in its own
right.
Additionally, the 1994 amendments allow the state to recover from
third parties, in a single proceeding, Medicaid payments made to multiple
recipients without having to identify each recipient individually. 7" The
statute demands the judiciary to liberally construe the evidence code when

determining issues of causation and damages, and allows for proof of
these issues via statistical analysis. 80 The amendments also allow for
theories of market-share liability and joint and several liability to be used
simultaneously as long as the products in question are "substantially
interchangeable among brands."'" This provision eliminates the burden
of proving which manufacturer caused a specific injury. The defense of

76
77

gency, 678 So. 2d at 1244.
ch. 409.910(1) (Supp. 1994) ("Principles of common law and equity as to
assignment, lien, subrogation, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and all other
affirmative defenses normally available to a liable third party, are to be abrogated to the extent
necessary to ensure full recovery by Medicaid from third-party resources."
78
[d. ch. 409.910(6)(A) ("The agency has a cause of action against a liable third party to
recover the full amount of medical assistance provided by Medicaid, and such cause of action is
independent of any rights or causes of action of the recipient."
79
Id. ch. 409.910(9) ("The agency may bring an action to recover sums paid to all such
recipients in one proceeding .... The agency shall not be required to identify the individual
recipients for which payment has been made, but rather can proceed to seek recovery based upon
payments made on behalf of an entire class of recipients.").
80
s d. ("In any action brought under this subsection, the evidence code shall be liberally
construed regarding the issues of causation and of aggregate damages.").
81
Id. ch. 409.910(9)(b) ("The agency shall be allowed to proceed under a market share
theory, provided that the products involved are substantially interchangeable among brands, and
that substantially similar factual or legal issue would be involved in seeking recovery against each
liable third party individually."); Id. ch. 409.9 10(l) ("The concept of joint and several liability
applies to any recovery on the part of the agency.")
FLA. STAT.
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the statute of repose is also eliminated by these amendments.' Thus, the
Act essentially weakens all possible defenses while easing the burden of
the state in proving causation. The Act does, however, specify that
Florida is limited to recovery of Medicaid funds paid out in the last five
83
years.
The Florida statute is also controversial because of the
unconventional method used to pass this legislation. The amendments are
scattered throughout a previously existing Medicaid Act entitled "An Act
Relating to Medicaid Provider Fraud."' The tobacco companies allege
the bill was passed unanimously in both the House and the Senate without
a single debate." Ironically, however, within a year of passage, both
houses voted to repeal the amendments. 6 This time, however, Florida's
Governor Lawton Chiles, a proponent of the enabling legislation, vetoed
the repeal.8
The statute ultimately became effective July 1, 1994 and targets the
tobacco industry.8" Although the Act refers to any third-party entity that
may be liable for Medicaid costs, Governor Chiles specifically "ordered
the relevant executive branch officials to pursue the recovery of Medicaid
expenditures from only the tobacco industry. '"S9 Thus, the clear purpose
of the Act is to allow the state to obtain reimbursement for Medicaid
expenses that may be attributed to cigarette smoking." This contention
is strengthened by the fact the Florida legislature has rejuvenated its
efforts to repeal the law now that the suit against the tobacco industry has
been settled." Specifically, a spokeswoman for Florida's House Speaker

klI ch. 409.910(12)(h) (Supp. 1994) ("The defense of statute of repose shall not apply to
any action brought under this section by the agency.")
"Id. ("Actions to enforce the rights of the department under this section shall ba
commenced within five years after the date a cause of action accrues.")
41994 FLA. LAWS ch. 94-251.

"Associated Ind. of Fla. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., No. 94-3128 (Leon Cty. Cir.
Ct., Complaint For Declaratory Relief, filed June 30, 1995), availablein LEXIS.
"Meade, supra note 30, at 127; State Judge Lifts Stay on Tobacco Suit Sceking Medicaid
Cost Reimbursement, 4 Health Care Poly Rep. (BNA) No.12, at D-23 (Mar. 18, 1996); Pearson,
supra note 16, at 610.
"Id.
"Meade, supra note 30, at 127.

"Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Ind. of Fla.,, 678 So.2d 1239, 1246 (Fla.
1996).

" Pearson, supra note 16, at 610.
"'RepublicanEffort Mounted to Repeal Controversial1994 Tobacco Liability Laiv, Health
Care Daily (BNA) at D-10 (Aug. 28, 1997).
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stated: "Certainly, the main causation for folks was jeopardizing the
tobacco settlement. With the settlement made and signed, I think there's
great interest in repealing the law altogether."92
The Act itself, however, refers to any third-party, and the governor's
executive order is not viewed as binding law.93 In 1995, a Florida Circuit
Court judge ruled the application of the statute would not be limited to the
tobacco industry. 94 He ruled the governor lacked the authority to limit
application of state statutes.95 This power is specifically reserved for the
legislature.96 This means that, unless there is an override of the governor's
veto, Florida courts will construe this law as applicable to all third parties,
businesses and individual citizens alike. Because it is viewed as
detrimental to Floridians, a 1996 poll showed widespread public support
for an override, but the Governor remains adamant that the law will
stand.97

Florida's initiative is being followed in other areas of the country as
well. Massachusetts has enacted legislation quite similar to the Florida
statute. 98 California, Maine, and New York have also considered such
legislation.99 Even Congress has addressed proposed legislation regarding
this issue. 'a Many states have gone as far as filing complaints against the
tobacco industry that follow the format of Florida's independent cause of
action, even though their legislatures have not passed the requisite
statutory authority.1'
State of Florida v. The American Tobacco Co.

Basing its claim on the newly enacted Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act,
the state of Florida filed suit against the tobacco industry on February 21,
1995202 The complaint allege the cigarette industry as a whole was

9Id.

"Associated IndustriesRepeats CallForRepeal ofMedicaid Third-PartyLiabilityLaw, PR

News Wire,
May 25, 1995, available in LEXIS.
94

Id.

951d.
96
1d.

'7 Associated Industries Says Poll Shows Floridians Want Override of Chiles' Veto, 21

Mealey's Litig. Rep. Tobacco 10 (Mar. 7, 1996).
8
Meade, supranote 30, at 127.
99Id.
1'0ld.
'"Pearson, supra note 16, at 610.
"Florida Complaint, supra note 3.
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responsible for the current health crisis pervading Florida."°" The state
claimed this crisis occurred because the tobacco industry ignored and
suppressed the truth about the hazards of cigarette smoking.' As a result,
a proliferation of Medicaid recipients contracted a multitude of cigaretterelated diseases.0 5 The state also claimed the cigarette industry should
bear the burden of paying for the medical expenses of these recipients,
rather than allowing government funds to be depleted. t 5 The complaint
further alleged that unless the tobacco industry is held responsible for
these expenses, cuts in state spending or tax increases would be necessary
to cover 10the
costs of providing medical care to these Medicaid
7
recipients.
The state of Florida is sought recovery on counts including unjust
enrichment negligence, fraud, and intentional misrepresentation. t63 These
counts were founded allegedly on conduct by the tobacco industry dating
back to 1953 when the first definitive link between cigarette smoking and
cancer was published.' °9 This study created a "health scare" regarding the
dangers of cigarette smoking. 10 The complaint claimed the tobacco
industry responded by counter-acting the potentially damaging
information with an offensive, pro-cigarette public relations ploy to
confuse the public and neutralize the anti-smoking advertisements that
followed from the scare.'
The complaint conceded, however, that a vast body of evidence
existed identifying smoking as one of the leading causes of lung cancer
and that this information is "uncontroverted and longstanding."" 2 The
complaint mentioned that although exact causation remained ambiguous,
no disagreement among reputable scientists existed about a causal

lId at 1.
Id
"O'Id.
104

16Id.

"°VFloridaComplaint, supranote 3, at 140.
'"Id.at 140-208. Other counts include indemnity, strict liability for a defective and
unreasonably dangerous product, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty,
negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking, conspiracy, concert of action, aiding and
abetting liability, and injunctive relief.
"0Id.at

11tOld
.

59.

"'Id.at 67.
"'Florida Complaint, supranote 3, at 68.
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association between smoking and disease.' 13 The state claimed the
tobacco industry has spent billions of dollars on promoting the myth that
this causal connection is not true." 4 The state also claimed that, due to the
industry's active concealment of the effects of smoking, they have only
recently discovered the defendants may be liable for Medicaid expenses. Ii
In retaliation, the tobacco industry presented documents to the Circuit
Court of Palm Beach County showing that Florida itself was at one time
a manufacturer of cigarettes." 6 The documents showed that Florida had
made and distributed cigarettes to prison inmates, state hospitals, and local
governments during the 1970s, with full knowledge of the health risks of
smoking." 7 In 1977, the state cigarette sales totaled S174,373. The judge
ruled these documents did not constitute a defense.
On August 25, 1997, after two and a half years of litigation, the
tobacco industry settled with Florida for $11.3 billion over the next
twenty-five years."' In response, the Governor of Florida said taxpayers
would finally be repaid for the $300 million
Florida has spent annually on
9
cigarette-related Medicaid expenses. "
A GENCY FOR HEAL TH CARE ADMINISTRATION v.
ASSOCIA TED INDUSTRIES OF FLORIDA
The Majority opinion
Approximately one year after the Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability
Act went into effect, Associated Industries of Florida filed a complaint for
declaratory relief alleging that Florida's method of recovering Medicaid
expenditures violated the Florida Constitution. 2 0 The Supreme Court of
Florida accepted jurisdiction of this case after an assertion by the First
District Court of Appeals that this matter was of great public importance
and needed to be resolved immediately.' 2 ' The court began its opinion by
1SId.

..Id.at 94.
ISId. at

122.

6

" FloridaTrial Court StrikesAffirmative Defenses of Tobacco Companies,Tobacco Litig,
Rep. (Feb. 14, 1997).
"1Id.

11id.
191d.
...Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Ind. of Fla., 678 So.2d 1239, 1246 (Fla.
1996).

1211d.at 1243.

1997]

MEDICAID THIRD-PARTYLIABILITYACT

noting that, due to the limited options involved in the appropriation of
public welfare funding, extreme caution is required when evaluating
legislative policy decisions." Although it struck a few minor provisions
that would have made it more difficult for cigarette manufacturers to
defend themselves, the court found the Act is, on its face, constitutional.'3
The court began by agreeing with Associated Industries' assertion
that the 1994 amendments gave Florida a new, independent cause of
action that abrogated affirmative defenses traditionally available to third
parties. 24 Before this, the State was confined to theories of subrogation,
assignment, and lien, under which the State was subject to the same
treatment that a Medicaid recipient would have encountered had they
pursued a claim.' 2 The amended statute's stated intent was to ensure that
Medicaid payments are a last resort, to be used only when all alternative
methods of payment have been exhausted. 26 The court conceded that this
new cause of action not only moved Florida "to the front of the line vis-avis other innocent parties," but also gave the State "an expanded right to
take priority
over innocent parties in claiming 'a pot of money once
'
127
""
obtained.
The court outlined six modifications to the statute showing the States
intention to create a cause of action to which traditional affirmative
defenses did not apply.22 First, the Act stated all affirmative defenses
were to be abrogated to the extent necessary in order to ensure the State's
recovery. 129 Second, the State was no longer required to identify
individual Medicaid recipients in their complaint.130 Third, the statute of
repose defense was specifically abrogated in any action that falls under the
Act.3 ' Fourth, the State was authorized to file multiple claims in a single
proceeding. 2 Fifth, the State was authorized to simultaneously utilize
theories of market share and joint and several liability.' 3 Sixth, the State
122 l

1231dL
'241d. at 1249.
'2Agency, 678 So.2d at 1249.
16Id.

I7Id.
12id.
Id.
"'Agency, 678 So.2d at 1249.
31
Md.
32Md.
"'id.at 1249-50.
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was authorized to use statistical analysis to prove causation and
damages. 34 These six modifications
were precisely what Associated
35
action.
this
in
challenged
Industries
The court addressed each of the modifications individually.136 The
court held that, on its face, the general abrogation of defenses did not
violate either the federal or state constitutions. 137 The court emphasized
that due process requires, and the United States Supreme Court expressly
recognizes, that states confront new legal dilemmas with new tort
remedies. 138 The court noted Florida case law demonstrates that a blanket
prohibition against eliminating certain affirmative defenses has never
existed in the state.139 The court cited examples from prior cases including
the elimination of contributory negligence and the adoption of
comparative negligence." The court also mentioned the abolition of the
defense of interspousal immunity. 141 Additionally the court mentioned
Florida's adoption of strict liability which did not allow for the defenses
of either contributory or comparative negligence.' Although it found the
provision to be facially constitutional, the court repeatedly reiterated the
fact that such a provision
would not necessarily survive future
43
constitutional attacks.
In terms of the second modification, the court determined the failure
to identify individual recipients would violate the due process guarantees
of the Florida Constitution. 144 The court found the defendants would be
precluded from challenging improper payments made to individual
recipients which may have resulted in fraud, misdiagnosis of the patient's
condition, or unnecessary treatments. 145 Also, this provision would
prevent defendants from proving a particular product was never even used

1341d. at 1250.
35
' Agency, 678 So.2d at 1250.
13 1d. at 1255-56.
37
1 1d.

3

at 1250.

1id. at 1250-53.

39

1 1d. at

1251.

M4Agency, 678 So.2d at 1250-52.
1411d.
1421d.
1431d.
'4"d. at 1253-54.

'4"Agency, 678 So.2d at 1254.
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by a particular recipient." 4 Thus, the court struck this provision from the
1994 amendments.1 47
The court also held the abolishment of the defense of the statute of
repose was unconstitutional and struck the third modification to the 1994
amendments.14 8 The court noted the Florida judiciary has always held
Congress cannot create legislation that revives time-barred claims.'49
In terms of the modification allowing for the joinder of claims, the
trial court had found this provision was an infringement on the judiciary's
power to establish practice and procedure.' 50 The Florida Supreme Court
5
disagreed and held this provision created no constitutional infirmity.' '
The court then addressed the issues of market-share liability and joint
and several liability.152 The court found either theory could be used
independently in a claim by the state to recover Medicaid expenses.'
However, the court found these theories could not be used simultaneously,
because they are fundamentally incompatible.1 4 Finally, the court found
the statute's allowance of the use of statistical analysis to prove causation
and damages was within the constraints of Floridas rules of practice and
procedure. 151 The court found the state still5retains
the burden of proving
6
its case, whether or not statistics are used.1
The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent took issue with several of the provisions outlined by the
majority. Most significantly, the dissent found the abrogation of defenses
to be unconstitutional.' 57 The dissent pointed to case law that stated an
affirmative defense cannot be taken away unless (1) a reasonable
alternative is provided by the legislature; or (2) there is an overpowering
necessity for the abolition of the right, and no alternative method of

Id.

147

1481

Id at 1254.

'50Agency, 678 So. 2d at 1254-55.
151

1d.

'id. at 1255-56.
155Agency, 678 So.2d at 1255-56.

156Iat

1
"71d. at 1258.
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meeting that necessity exists. 58 The statute did not meet the first test,
because affirmative defenses are abrogated altogether with no
alternative.'59 The dissent maintained the second test also fails because
traditional remedies of subrogation and assignment are a sufficient remedy
for the state to recoup Medicaid expenses. 60 Additionally, the dissent
mentioned reasonable alternatives, such as levying additional taxes upon
the sale of tobacco in an amount sufficient to reimburse the State for the
6
amount of money it spends.' '
The dissent also claimed the abrogation of affirmative defenses
provision was unconstitutional because the state gained an unfair litigation
advantage compared to the rest of society. 62 The dissent noted the
success or failure of cases involving medical bills would depend on
whether the injured party was on Medicaid. 63 This would apply to
products liability cases, as well as car accidents. 6' If the injured party was
65
on Medicaid, the defendant would lose all of his affirmative defenses.'
However, if the injured party paid his own medical bills, the defendant
would be able to raise the defenses of assumption of the risk or
comparative negligence. 166 Therefore, the dissent argued this provision
violated due process and equal protection.' 67 The dissent also agreed with
the trial court in terms of the joinder of claims issue.' 68 The dissent argued
that any statute that involved practice and procedure should be stricken,
even ifthe same practice and procedure was already authorized by judicial
rules. 69 Thus, this invasion on the power of the courts should be
considered unconstitutional. 70

IssId.
" 'd.
'"Agency, 678 So. 2d 1259.
61

1 1d.

1621d. at 1260.
163Id.

1"id. at 1250-60.
"'Agency, 678 So. 2d 1259.
1Id.
167Id.

1681d.
10Id. at 1254-55.
"7'Agency, 678 So. 2d 1259.
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari
A few months after the Florida Supreme Court held most of the
amendments constitutional, Associated Industries and Philip Morris, Inc.
asked the United States Supreme Court to review the opinion.'' The
petitioners contended that the law violates their due process rights by
removing all of their common law defenses.'n They maintained the effect
of the statute was an obligation of the Florida courts to follow the
legislature's mandate to ignore established rules of common law." They
also argued the statute is arbitrary, irrational, and conflicts with prior
Supreme Court decisions.' 74 On March 17, 1997, the Supreme Court of
the United States denied the petition."
ANALYSIS
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida declaring Florida's
Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act constitutional gives the state an
overwhelming advantage over the tobacco industry in any legal dispute.
The state's burden of proving its case is significantly diminished while the
tobacco industry, left with virtually no defense mechanism, has no legal
protection against excessive or arbitrary liability. The consequence of the
decision of the Florida Supreme Court, along with the United States
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, is unfair and arbitrary.
First, the complete abrogation of affirmative defenses violates the
due process clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions, which
provide that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.' 76 As the dissent noted, the right to defend
oneself in a court of law is embodied in the Constitution, as well as the
common law.' 77 As such, all affirmative defenses cannot be taken away

""Supreme Court Asked to Review Ruling on FloridaStatute, Health Law Litig. Rep. (Jan.
1997) (citing Associated Ind.of Fla.v. Agency for Health Care Admin., No. 96-915 (U.S. peition
filed Dec. 5, 1996)); Agency ForHealth CareAdministration UrgesHigh Court To Deny NIWt,

10 MEA LE'S LMG. REP.: TOBACCO (Feb. 20, 1997).
1

7Id.

174

'd

'Assoc. Ind. Of Fla. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 117 S.Ct. 1245 (1997).
'76U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. 1,§ 9.

"7'Agencyfor Health Care Admin. V. Associated Ind. of Fla.,, 678 So. 2d 1239, 1258 (F.1996) (citing Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1873)).
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without the provision of a reasonable alternative.' 78 The only exception
is when there is proof of an "overpowering public necessity." 7 9
In abolishing the rights of potentially liable third parties, the
legislature failed to provide a reasonable alternative. In fact, the
legislature did not provide third parties with any alternatives. Any third
party that may be potentially liable is left with no recourse, because the
statute says defendants will be unable to assert defenses. Moreover, the
state has not shown an overpowering interest in this legislation. The
Florida legislature voted to repeal the amendments within one year. If a
majority of the Florida Congress could vote against the measure almost
immediately after passage, the state interest cannot be that compelling.
The Florida statute also denies the tobacco industry, and any other
third party who may ultimately be afflicted, equal protection of the laws.
The United States Constitution provides, "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal

protection of the laws."' 80 The Florida statute defies this Constitutional
provision by allowing the state to bring a cause of action without facing
defenses that any other plaintiff bringing a claim in their individual
capacity must face. The statute precludes a potentially liable third party
from using defenses in a dispute with the state. But if a private party,
including the Medicaid recipient in question, brings the action, the third
party will be allowed to use traditional defenses. For example, assume
John Doe accidentally drives into Mary Dee. In a suit by Mary against
John, John would be able to defend himself if, for instance, Mary was also
negligent by running a red light. This would be the case even if Mary
were a Medicaid recipient. However, if the state of Florida wanted to seek
reimbursement from John (the potentially liable third party), John would
be unable to claim contributory negligence, and would automatically lose.
The tobacco industry has proven through recent decisions such as
Raulerson andRogers that these traditional defenses still can work toward
clearing the industry of liability. The abrogation of these defenses works
to unfairly handicap third parties in a court of law.
The Supreme Court has specifically stated that selective law
enforcement is prohibited in our judicial system. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
the Court stated:
1781d.

179M.e
'"°U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 8 '

The Florida statute was passed through the legislature without full and
open discussion, and it is obvious the Act is being administered with "an
evil eye" toward the tobacco industry. This is even further shown by the
Florida Governor's proclamation that only the tobacco industry would be
implicated by this legislation. Also, it is unfair for the courts to allow
restrictions on legal defenses in some circumstances (when Medicaid is
involved) and not others (when Medicaid is not involved). For instance,
in the case between John Doe and Mary Dee, if Mary is not a Medicaid
recipient, the state is unable to step in as plaintiff and take away all of
John's affirmative defenses. Regardless of how the state feels about the
tobacco industry, it should be forced to adhere to the same laws that apply
to the general public. It should not be able to change long-standing law
to suit its current needs.
Not only does the Florida statute arguably contravene the
constitution, common sense dictates that it is completely unfair for the
judiciary to permit the state to retain the powerful legal weapon of
precluding available defenses to a defendant. The tobacco industry is
being denied one of the most basic rights common to all Americans - that
is, the right to properly defend oneself in a court of law."r Theories such
as assumption of risk and contributory negligence allowed the industry
success after success in legal battles against individual plaintiffs for over
forty years. The final decision in Cipollone was written in 1992.3 At the
trial level, the jury found Rose Cipollone to be 80 percent contributorily
negligent.'84 The jurors believed the choice to smoke was her own."
Although Liggett was found liable to Mr. Cipollone for $400,000, Rose
. tYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
'8U.S. Const. Amend. V; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Fla. Const. Art. 1, § 9.
'"Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
'"Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988).

'"Michael J. Hannan, The Effect of Cippollone: Has The Tobacco Industry Lost Its
ImpenetrableShield?, 23 GA. L.REv. 763, 775 (1989).
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Cipollone herself was not awarded any damages. 186 Now, in a claim filed

by Florida, a jury is no longer able to decide who is primarily responsible
for a smoker's health problems. The tobacco industry would automatically
be considered 100 percent liable because the Medicaid Third-Party
Liability Act prohibits a jury from considering defenses that could serve
to offset a claim of liability.
Although the FDA has recently declared that nicotine is addictive,'87
this does not mean, as the state claims, that smokers do not make their
own choices to smoke. 88 Florida claims the tobacco industry has
consciously attempted to induce the general public into the belief that
there is nothing wrong with smoking cigarettes and that they are not
addictive. 89 However, the industry as a whole has faithfully complied
with the Cigarette Labeling Act by ensuring every cigarette container and
advertisement states the product is dangerous. Even without this
safeguard against deceiving people, it is common knowledge that smoking
is hazardous to health. As one commentator put it, "It is unlikely that
there are many in the general population of smokers who now believe, or
ever believed, that smoking cigarettes is harmless."' 9 Additionally, the
Cigarette Labeling Act gave an affirmative duty to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to annually follow-up on the health consequences of
smoking. Thus, regardless of who knew or did not know about the
hazards of smoking, it is the job of the government, not the tobacco
industry, to investigate the matter and ensure that these hazards do
minimal damage to the health of the American people.
People who smoke clearly take a risk that their health will be in
danger. It is irrelevant whether the risk taken entails that the product is
addictive and that it will be difficult to stop the habit, or that health
problems in general will occur at some point in life. It is a risk taken
nonetheless. The Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act eliminates
assumption of the risk, a previously valid defense, from the repertoire of
the tobacco companies. Since juries in the first and second waves of
tobacco litigation consistently found smokers to assume the risk of the
186 d

'"McGinley, CigarettesNow on Market Are Addictive, FDA DrugAbuse Advisory Panel
Finds, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1994, at B8.
...Florida Complaint, supra note 103, at 77.
t Pearson, ssupranoteed6
16, at 617.
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dangers of smoking, there is no reason to believe ajury could not arrive
at a similar conclusion in a case against the state. It is unfair for the
industry to be considered inherently responsible for resulting medical
problems, while being denied the opportunity to allot responsibility to
those who may be equally responsible. The state should not be allowed
to set legal standards that place it in a better position than individual
smokers who otherwise might bring suit against tobacco companies on
their own behalf.
It is argued that even though the state's claim is based on the
provision of medical care for the health problems of Medicaid recipients
who smoke, the state, as an individual plaintiff, did not assume the risk of
anything. Since the state did not do the smoking, it could not be blamed
for contributing to any health problems. If this is true, the state does not
need the elimination of assumption of the risk as a safety net and it should
be stricken from the act. If a trial between the state and the tobacco
industry never touched upon the contributory negligence of Medicaid
recipients who smoke, then assumption of the risk as a defense should
never have been taken away to begin with.
Alternatively, it can be said that the state did assume a risk, and thus,
tobacco companies should be allowed to utilize this defense. It is clear
from Florida's complaint that the state has known for decades that tobacco
is linked to a variety of illnesses and health problems.'' Despite this
knowledge, the state continued to insure the health of millions of
Medicaid recipients who smoke. Although the state did not do the
smoking, it knowingly assumed the risk of paying for the medical
expenses of those who do smoke. Medicaid has always required the states
to ascertain the legal liability of third parties since its 1968 enactment, and
the state never bothered to hold third parties liable until recently, when
Medicaid began to fail.
As the dissent in AssociatedIndustries correctly points out, there is
a huge difference between not being allowed to utilize a particular
defense, and having no defenses at all.' 92 Without defenses, the tobacco
industry is being held strictly liable for manufacturing and selling a
perfectly legal product. If, as the state's complaint alleged, the evidence
'Florida Complaint, supra note 3, at 68 ("The vast body of evidence that identifies
smoking as a leading cause of lung cancer is uncontroverted and of long standing.')
91
Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Ind. Of Fla., 678 So. 2d 11239, 1258-9
(Fla. 1996).
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against the industry was mounting, the industry should be allowed to
refute such evidence within the constraints of a fair trial. Strict liability
has never been held to be a viable theory against the tobacco industry, and
there is no reason to begin such a trend. This contention is strongly
emphasized by the RESTATEMENT'S explanation that cigarettes are not

considered to be an unreasonably dangerous product for purposes of strict
liability. It would be completely unfair to suddenly hold an entire industry
strictly liable for the sale of a product that has always been societally
acceptable. Significantly, Illinois Attorney General Jim Ryan stated to the
media that the state of Illinois had no intent or desire to shut down a legal
industry.'93 Assuming other states, such as Florida, share this notion, the
abrogation of affirmative defenses allows a theory of strict liability to
enter the courtroom that would seriously undermine any state's desire to
keep the industry intact.
The Florida legislation is unfair, because the provision allowing for
a market-share theory of liability allows responsibility to be placed on
tobacco companies based on the percentage of each companies' control

over the market. Under this theory, liability can be easily misplaced.
According to the statute, the product involved must be substantially
interchangeable among brands. 94 Although ajury of ordinary consumers

may not be able to differentiate between brands of cigarettes, all cigarettes
are by no means designed identically. If they were, tobacco companies
would not bother manufacturing many different brands of cigarettes.
Cigarettes vary greatly in size, type of filter, and quantity of tar and
nicotine.' 95 According to the state, cigarettes also contain a variety of
toxins and harmful chemicals.'96 Any one of these materials may

contribute more significantly than others to smoking's harmful effects on
health. Thus, a particular company's share of the cigarette market may be
very different from the percentage of liability that should fairly be
attributed to it.
The market-share theory of liability also allows for unfair distribution
of liability, because Medicaid recipients may not be representative of the
entire market. Medicaid recipients receive government aid for their health
."3 Sue Ellen Christians, IllinoisJoins OtherStates in Suing Tobacco Firms, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
13, 1996, § 2, at 1.
'"Fla. Stat. ch. 409.910(9) (b) (West 1997).
""Pearson, supra note 16, at 630.
"'Florida Complaint, supra note 3.

1997]

MEDICAID THIRD-PARTYLIABILITYACT

problems because they fall below the poverty line. This means that they
may purchase the cheapest cigarettes available. Since the consumption of
cigarettes among low-income Floridians may significantly differ from that
of the state-wide market, cigarette
companies should not be held liable for
97
market.
the
of
their share
Additionally, each company's share of the market may change over
time, for the entire class of consumers, as well as individual groups.
Combined with the fact that cigarette-related illnesses do not typically
surface immediately, it would be extremely difficult to decipher exactly
which market is determinative of liability. These factors all contribute to
an unfair distribution of responsibility for Medicaid expenditures. In
order to avoid the array of problems that will arise upon application of this
theory, the Florida Supreme Court should have struck the entire marketshare provision from the 1994 amendments. Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court should have reviewed this case in order to prevent
such unfair litigation from infiltrating the courts.
The provision in the AcVs 1994 amendments allowing for the use of
statistical evidence is also an unfair element in the determination of
liability. According to the majority opinion, the new, independent cause
of action that the state has created for itself requires it to prove three
things:
1) negligence or a defective product;
2) causation; and
3) damages. 98
Two of these elements, causation and damages, can be proven by
statistical analysis according to the statute.'99 Since statistical analysis is
not, and never will be, an exact showing of causation or damages, the
Florida court should not allow it to define which entity is responsible for
damages. Tobacco companies should be liable only for damages that they
actually incurred. Statistics tend to be misleading, and a jury's verdict
7Studies have shown that different groups of people prefer different brands of cigarettes.
One report showed that the three best-selling brands among minors accounted for 86 percent of
the adolescent market, whereas the three best-selling brands for adults account for only 35 p.rcent
of the total market. See supranote 18.
t'Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Ind. of Fla., 678 So.2d 1239, 1250 (Fla.
1996).
'99FA. STAT. ch. 409.910 (Vest 1997).
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may be quite different from what it would be if the jury was only allowed
to view evidence regarding each recipient, as opposed to a statistical
analysis on the general population of smokers. Although the state's
overall injury might be independent of the individual elements
surrounding each case, the industry's liability for damages is not and
proximate cause should be determined in every case in order to place
liability where it should truly be.
Another reason why the decision of the Florida Supreme Court is
problematic is because ensuring that the tobacco industry is held fully
responsible for the medical expenses of Medicaid recipients who smoke
is an ineffective method of curing the current health crisis. The reasoning
behind the Florida legislature's drafting of the Medicaid Third-Party
Liability Act is to shift the burden of paying for the enormous medical
expenses of Medicaid recipients with cigarette-related diseases to those
entities that should rightly pay, as well as to fix the unfortunate state of
Americans' health. Florida's Act does not help either goal.
In terms of allocating financial responsibility to the tobacco industry,
the Act fails in that funds are still likely to come from Florida's taxpayers.
In order to save their industry, tobacco companies would have to do
something to raise the money that it would owe to Florida. One resource
would be raising the prices of cigarettes. If, as the state claims, smokers
are addicted to nicotine to the point that they have no control over the
habit,2° most smokers can be expected to continue to purchase cigarettes
regardless of the price. Therefore, the cost of medical expenses for
Medicaid recipients would be put back into the hands of consumers and
smokers of all financial backgrounds would pay for the government's ploy
to assure that the tobacco industry loses in court. Additionally, others who
have contributed to the demise of American health due to tobacco,
including the government and smokers themselves, will be allowed to
escape responsibility. The state of Florida, in particular, will never be
held responsible for its personal status as a one-time manufacturer of
cigarettes.
The Act would also fail in its attempt to cure the health crisis that the
tobacco industry has allegedly created through its sale of a hazardous
product. Florida's complaint demands that the tobacco industry pay for

2

"°Florida Complaint, supra note 3.
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cigarette-related diseases because they have been receiving a "wvindfall."'13
The complaint also asks for injunctive relief so that the industry must
demote their products through public education of the connection between
smoking and poor health.02 However, the state does not demand the
industry change its product. Thus, the vicious circle would continue
indefinitely. Cigarettes will still pervade the consumer market: people
will buy cigarettes, people will become addicted, these same people will
eventually acquire cigarette-related illnesses, the tobacco industry will be
charged with responsibility for their medical expenses, and the taxpayers
will end up paying for it. This cycle will not help people to become
healthier. Thus, Florida's Act will fail in its supposed attempt to help the
finances and health of its citizens.
IMPACT
The Florida statute is not about who should and should not be liable. The
state claims that it is about the health of Florida citizens. But when all the
facts are reviewed, it becomes clear that the statute is really about money.
This statute does not make tobacco illegal. Thus, people will continue to
smoke as they always have. Additionally, states vill continue to
capitalize off of the economic benefits of the tobacco industry. Governor
Chiles himself recently proposed a tax increase of ten cents per box of
cigarettes.2 °3 He reasoned that Florida would make an extra S121 million
a year.2 4 If the governor had any intention of improving the citizens'
health by reducing smoking, he certainly would not be expecting such a
large financial outcome from such a proposal. Thus, the governor
anticipates continuing to capitalize off of an industry that he also wishes
to penalize. At the same time, he will be reimbursed for past smokingrelated Medicaid expenses, essentially re-routing the financial vAndfall to
the State as opposed to a legitimate industry.
Although Florida's enabling legislation may help them to win a legal
battle against the tobacco industry, the battle will still not be smooth
sailing. The state will have to spend a significant amount of government
2

ld at 46.
79.
'Govemor Would Veto Attempt to Repeal ControversialTobacco-LiabilityLay4 5 Health
Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA), No. 11, at D-24 (May 17, 1997).
'I01 at
4
:O
IdL
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money on legal fees. Although the state has clearly obtained a legal
advantage, the industry will continue to utilize as many procedural tactics
as it did in past cases against individual smokers. These tactics date back
to 1954, when the first wave of tobacco litigation began. The industry as
a whole paid damages in only two cases during a forty year period.

Although some commentators say that individual states and their
resources may be able to finally break the industry's chain of legal success,
states can hardly be said to be on equal financial footing with the multimillion dollar tobacco industry. If states are complaining that they are
having trouble paying for the medical bills of Medicaid recipients,
enormous legal fees will make it even harder for states to keep their
finances afloat.
Since Florida's legislation is the most enabling of state actions
throughout the country, the fact that it has survived constitutional attacks
is likely to be significant for pending litigation in the other states. By
refusing to review this case, the United States Supreme Court has
essentially condoned one-sided litigation as Well as punishment of a legal
industry. This may set a trend of enormous state settlements similar to the
one Florida was able to obtain. Even the states without enabling
legislation that have modeled their complaints after the cause of action
outlined in Florida's Act may prevail in court. Passage of acts like
Florida's will create a landscape of hostility toward the tobacco industry
and could effect decisions of juries. This landscape has already been
demonstrated by the proliferation of lawsuits filed by states against the
industry. Success of these lawsuits may also lead to a new wave of
litigation between individual plaintiffs and the industry. This time the
plaintiffs may be the ones to enjoy successful lawsuits.
The hostile landscape this legislation is likely to produce will also
create interstate, as well as intrastate controversy among state officials.
One example is the current legal dispute between Mississippi Attorney
General Mike Moore and Mississippi Governor Kirk Fordice, government
officials who are on opposite ends of the battle.20 5 Also, if the various
states prevail, the industry has the potential to file for bankruptcy. This
will create a commercial handicap for those agriculturally-oriented states
which still produce tobacco.
2

OFordice v. Moore, Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition and for Declaratory

Judgment (Miss Sup. Ct. Filed Feb. 16, 1996) availablein LEXIS.
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Legislation like Florida's also paves the way for other industries to
face liability for reasons beyond health problems caused by a particular
product If a legal battle between a state and an entire industry can make
it through the trial stage, any corporation may be prime for attack. As one
Philip Morris attorney eloquently stated, "Tobacco is the politically
incorrect product today. Once you extend the law this far ...
who's to say
product. '2 -6
incorrect
politically
next
the
with
date
what youd do at a later
Although Governor Chiles declared that the tobacco industry is the only
entity that would be attacked through the Medicaid Act, the language of
the statute is not set up that way. The legislation refers to any third party,
which means all corporations are subject to future attack.2 7 Legislation
such as this will elicit concern among all large corporations across the
country.
In general, the legislation appears to be an unfair attempt to punish
the tobacco companies. However, cigarettes have been around for over
400 years and are legal around the world. If there is to be a change, it
needs to start with Congress. Tobacco companies should not be punished
for selling a perfectly legal product. If the Surgeon General feels strongly
enough that nicotine is addictive, and not merely habitual, then action
should be taken at the federal level. Tobacco companies should not be the
only entities responsible for researching the adverse health effects of
cigarettes.
Additionally, they should only be responsible for
disseminating as much information as is required of them by the
legislature. It is ridiculous to expect an industry to tell the public NOT to
buy their product.
Essentially, states could have started their campaign to save money
on cigarette-related Medicaid expenses a long time ago by advertising
against cigarette smoking themselves. They also could have spent their
time and money more wisely by making it illegal to smoke in all public
places. Much of society smokes on a social basis and this would cut
smokers' habit fairly fast. A change in federal legislation, as opposed to
an aid for states in fighting legal battles, will represent the country as a
whole, without wasting the states' resources and saving the tobacco
companies from having to litigate for an indefinite number of years.

2

06State AG Asks Court to Sanction Tobacco Firmsfor "Frivolous" Suit, 4 Health Care
Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at D-39 (May 20, 1996).

207205

FLA. STAT. ch. 409-910 (West 1997).
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CONCLUSION

Florida's Medicaid Third Party Liability Act is unfair, ineffective, and has
many Constitutional deficiencies. The Florida Supreme Court should not
have allowed the Act to pass judicial scrutiny as legally sound. Although
the court did acknowledge that it anticipated many constitutional issues
upon application, a declaration of facial constitutionality severely injures
the tobacco industry. The state is practically guaranteed success in court.
Had the United States Supreme Court agreed to review this case, it could
have prevented Florida, and the rest of the country, from gaining
reimbursement for medical expenses which the nation continues to
support by purchasing its products.

